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In meetings among like-minded states and advocacy organizations trying to reduce nuclear risks, 
optimism generated by influential endorsements of the idea that everybody would be safer in a 
world without nuclear weapons is tempered by intense frustration about the difficulty of inching 
forward toward that goal.1 It is tempting to blame all the obstacles on somebody else—states that 
cling to the power and prestige associated with nuclear weapons, or special interest groups that 
prevent national leaders from acting for the greater good. A more constructive response might 
include examining whether some strategic choices made by those who want to reach domestic 
and international agreement on major nuclear risk reduction measures might be having 
unintended, and counter-productive effects, because these choices are within our direct control.  
 
If we in the broad community of international arms control and nonproliferation are honest, we 
will admit that deep ambivalence exists, not only among those who doubt the possibility or 
desirability of eliminating all nuclear weapons, but also among many who wholeheartedly 
support that goal, but are uncomfortable about the larger changes to security policy that would be 
necessary to reach it. Uniting around the vision of “no nuclear weapons” obscures important, but 
highly divisive, questions about the kind of alternative security arrangements that will be needed 
as we reduce, and then eliminate or fundamentally transform the role of nuclear weapons and the 
institutions built around them.  
 
I want to highlight four main areas of ambivalence among members of the arms control and 
nonproliferation community. The first involves strategic stability on the road to zero, especially 
among Russia, China, and the United States. The second involves alliance relations, particularly 
how to ensure NATO cohesion and preserve extended deterrence as nuclear arsenals decline. The 
third involves global governance at a time when states care more about preserving flexibility and 
minimizing short-term costs than they do about the long-term benefits of cooperation. The fourth 
involves peaceful nuclear technology, now and if global use expands dramatically to avert 
catastrophic climate change. 
 
Disagreements about how to handle these four areas of ambivalence reflect real and current 
concerns, not just misperceptions or outmoded Cold War mindsets. Failure to address them will 
make the diplomatic and political environment progressively less favorable even for incremental 
arms control or nonproliferation advances, let alone for truly transformational leaps. Mishandling 
them by making domestic and allied support for nuclear cooperation contingent on moves that 
will predictably increase international opposition, or vice versa, will make it impossible to get 
the multi-level support required to move forward.2 
 
A more productive strategy involves confronting our own ambivalence, then considering how 
individuals, nongovernmental organizations, analysts, and national representatives can practice 
systematic mutual reassurance not only among those considered part of their like-minded group, 
but including everybody whose cooperation is needed to fulfill the long-term objectives of the 
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Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT). It is daunting to contemplate broadening the agenda of 
challenging issues that must be simultaneously addressed to make sure that the level of nuclear 
cooperation rises faster the growing risks from residual arsenals, proliferators, and catastrophic 
terrorists. But pursuing this broader cooperative security agenda is essential to build winning 
coalitions needed to secure domestic and international agreement on practical measures that will 




During the Cold War, the primary function attributed to both nuclear weapons and arms control 
was to preserve strategic stability—to minimize incentives for a disarming first strike, for pre-
emption in a crisis, for escalation from a limited conflict to a general nuclear war, and for 
wasteful or dangerous arms racing. 
 
A common question asked of those working for a nuclear weapon-free world is how to keep the 
risk of deterrence failure from going up as the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons goes 
down. In theory, strategic stability might be harder to preserve at very low numbers for many 
reasons, including concerns about ensuring the survivability of a sufficient retaliatory force; fears 
that low-level cheating on arms control would be more militarily significant; and worries that a 
second-tier nuclear weapon state might be more tempted to challenge a first-tier state that no 
longer had overwhelming nuclear superiority.  
 
The typical response is that overwhelming U.S. conventional military superiority will ensure 
strategic stability on the road to zero nuclear weapons. This builds off the logic behind the Bush 
administration’s new strategic triad, in which reductions in offensive nuclear weapons are offset 
by increases in precision conventional offense, missile defense, and a responsive infrastructure 
that could rapidly build new nuclear weapons if future U.S. policymakers decided they were 
needed. 
 
This answer is an effective way to reduce American and allied concerns about strategic stability 
because it assumes that their side would have far more overall strategic capability than potential 
rivals in a world with few or no nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this conventional superiority 
could be used without breaking the nuclear taboo, generating radioactive fallout, or causing 
disproportionate civilian casualties. The responsive infrastructure would also provide a much 
larger hedge against nuclear uncertainty and a greater ability to exploit future technological 
developments for non-nuclear strategic advantages.  
 
From the perspective of Russian and Chinese strategic planners, though, using international 
cooperation to reduce nuclear weapons without corresponding constraints on other U.S. strategic 
capabilities looks highly destabilizing. It would validate a security paradigm in which security 
relations among the big three remain fundamentally competitive while changing the rules and the 
tools of the game in ways that further favor the side that is already in the strongest position.   
 
Much as the United States might like to keep nuclear arms control completely separate from 
missile defense and space weapons, the three are inextricably linked for Russia and China. The 
July 2009 Joint Understanding between presidents Obama and Medvedev specified that a new 
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START accord should include “the situation regarding the relationship of strategic offensive and 
defensive weapons.”3 Disagreement about that topic was a prime impediment to replacing 
START I before it expired in December 2009.  The resulting treaty mentions the offense-defense 
relationship in its pre-amble but places no legal limits on missile defense, a compromise that 
only intensified opposition from treaty opponents in both countries’ ratification debates. Russian 
and Chinese diplomats have also consistently underscored that putting dedicated weapons in 
space, especially missile defense interceptors, or using any type of capability as an anti-satellite 
weapon would undermine existing strategic stability, impede nuclear arms reductions, and 
generate a new strategic competition as dangerous and expensive as the Cold War.4 
 
To avoid reinforcing foreign arguments against arms control, we must find a way to address 
domestic and allied concerns about strategic stability on the road to zero without inadvertently 
intensifying insecurity for other countries. Of course, it would be equally counterproductive to 
answer Russian and Chinese concerns by making further nuclear reductions depend on first 
equalizing or eliminating U.S. advantages in conventional offense and missile defense because 
that would generate blocking opposition from U.S. domestic and allied interests.  
 
A more realistic and effective strategy would accept the existing imbalance of strategic 
capabilities as a basic feature of the global security environment that is not going to change 
dramatically anytime soon, given the huge disparity in defense spending and technology 
development over the past two decades. But instead of assuming that overwhelming U.S. 
military superiority automatically enhances security for us and anyone else who does not want to 
challenge the status quo, we should treat it as a mixed blessing—like nuclear weapons 
themselves—that needs to be carefully managed to have net positive effects on security rather 
than to stimulate dangerous counter-reactions.  
 
If the primary function of Cold War arms control was to stabilize mutual deterrence between two 
roughly equal powers, now the primary function should be to provide mutual reassurance among 
many diverse states with widely differing capabilities and complex interdependent relationships. 
As part of our strategy to convince Russia and China to do more on nuclear reductions and 
nonproliferation, we should be trying to provide more concrete and credible reassurance about 
how the United States and its allies intend to use their current non-nuclear strategic advantages, 
and how we intend to develop them in the future. This means using our current advantages in 
information, advanced technologies, and military capabilities in ways that improve the security 
and well-being of all countries. It also means supporting equitable rules about access to, and use 
of, these twenty-first century sources of power, so that other countries do not feel that we are 
trying to keep them in a perpetually subordinate position. 
 
Since space and missile defense are two strategic realms where the Russians and Chinese have 
been most pointedly asking for reassurance, it makes sense to consider what the United States 
could do there to improve the prospects for nuclear cooperation.  It is not realistic to reinstate the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, so we need others way to provide reliable reassurance that any 
future missile defense system will be designed and operated in a way that provides protection 
against a small number of missiles from proliferators or terrorists, but that does not undermine 
the Russian or Chinese nuclear deterrent so long as it is central to their security strategy vis-à-vis 
the United States.   
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So far, the Obama administration has responded to Russian concerns by reviving old proposals 
for increased missile defense transparency, early warning data exchanges, and unspecified 
possible future joint missile defense activities.5 The most it currently offers China is “strategic 
dialogue.” These kinds of confidence-building measures pale in comparison to the 
administration’s open-ended plans to keep enhancing long-range missile defense capabilities in 
the United States while working harder to build and integrate increasingly capable regional 
missile defense systems in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.  
 
If the Obama administration wanted to provide more meaningful strategic reassurance, it could 
start by ruling out the testing and use of space-based missile defense interceptors, the basing 
mode that is technologically least mature and most expensive, but that (theoretically, at least) 
would be uniquely capable of boost-phase intercepts against launches from internal locations of 
large countries. This move could be taken unilaterally or multilaterally, alone or in conjunction 
with a comparable norm or legal prohibition on the testing and use of hit-to-kill anti-satellite 
weapons. The Obama administration should also shift from passively supporting discussions 
about space codes of conduct and transparency measures to actively promoting serious 
negotiations over stronger steps to prevent weapons from being tested or used in space and to 




It will be equally important to address American allies’ ambivalence about nuclear reductions 
not primarily by building up non-nuclear strategic military capabilities, but by undertaking 
political actions to demonstrate that relationships among traditional U.S. allies will be as strong, 
cohesive and important as ever in a world without nuclear weapons and with more inclusive 
security arrangements.  
 
A politically potent argument against deep U.S. nuclear reductions is the assertion that unless the 
United States keeps more nuclear capability than it needs to deter Russia or China from attacking 
the United States, its allies will lose confidence that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has extra room to 
shelter them, and they will develop their own nuclear weapons. This logic is faulty: Keeping 
extra U.S. nuclear weapons does not make it correspondingly more likely that the United States 
would risk Los Angeles to retaliate for a nuclear attack on Tokyo. The evidence of allied 
propensity to proliferate is also extremely weak. But because of the symbolic role that nuclear 
weapons have played in alliances formed during the Cold War, there are senior officials from 
some allied countries who are concerned that a more restrictive U.S. nuclear-use doctrine, the 
removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, or other changes to U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy would have a negative political effect on a relationship that is critical to their security 
policy. This amorphous concern about the political effect of changes to U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy is then used in U.S. policy debates by those who oppose change as an altruistic reason for 
retaining larger numbers and more diverse types of nuclear weapons at higher levels of 
operational readiness than could be justified by an objective assessment of what the United 
States actually needs to address any plausible nuclear threats from Russia, China, regional 
proliferators, or terrorists.6  
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Those who want to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy typically respond 
to these concerns about alliance politics in one of two ways, depending on whether their 
preferred long-term goal is to keep a smaller nuclear deterrent or to eliminate all nuclear 
weapons. Both responses start by affirming that regional threats confronting U.S. allies are real 
and growing, and that increasing allied military capability is the appropriate response. Minimal 
deterrence proponents then argue that by planning to use nuclear weapons only in response to a 
nuclear attack on the United States or its allies, the United States is reserving nuclear threats for 
the two scenarios where they would be most credible and is acknowledging the need for non-
nuclear options to address all other cases. Advocates for elimination go a bit further, suggesting 
progressive steps to de-nuclearize NATO and reconfigure the alliance relationship between the 
United States and Japan by replacing the U.S. nuclear guarantee with closer and more active 
cooperation on missile defense and advanced technologies for precision conventional offense.  
 
These strategies for addressing allied ambivalence about U.S. nuclear reductions compound 
Russian and Chinese unease about their own security in a world where nuclear weapons have 
less salience by reaffirming the continued centrality of exclusive alliances whose purpose, 
cohesion, capabilities, and budgets all benefit from worst-case depictions of external threats. 
This is not what either country expected would happen after the Cold War ended, and it makes it 
much harder to get their cooperation on North Korea, Iran, or any other Twenty-first Century 
security challenge.  
 
After the end of the Cold War, Russia had hoped that the nascent cooperative security 
institutions in Europe would evolve to replace bilateral alliance confrontation as the dominant 
mode of security organization. China had begun to engage more actively and constructively in 
numerous multilateral security fora in the expectation that they would become progressively 
more important for managing global security.  
 
Instead, the George W. Bush administration saw the huge disparity in global military power that 
developed in the decade after the Cold War as a reason why the United States should do 
whatever might increase its own security, unilaterally if necessary, without being unduly 
constrained by international law, multilateral organizations, or objections from other states. It 
initiated a war against Iraq without Security Council approval; it rejected or blocked any new 
multilateral constraints on U.S. military capabilities; it supported NATO membership for former 
Soviet states; and it forged a new strategic partnership with India as a counterweight to China. 
The Obama administration has returned to a more multilateral orientation, but so far it has done 
more to reaffirm multilateral organizations that exclude Russia and China, and that are at least 
partially directed against them, than it has to rebuild organizations where they could have an 
equal voice and receive equitable security benefits.  
 
One of the strongest arguments for the global elimination of nuclear weapons, accepted as self-
evident by those who would like to denuclearize U.S. alliance relations, is that discriminatory 
rules for nuclear weapons are self-defeating and unsustainable. But how can we expect all NPT 
nuclear weapon states to give up the perceived security and prestige benefits of membership in 
that exclusive club when some see no prospect of either joining or disbanding the world’s other 
most powerful and prestigious security club, the U.S. alliance system? 
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In posing this question, I am not proposing that alliance relationships which have stood their 
members in good stead for decades should be weakened as a quid pro quo for gaining more 
Russian and Chinese help on nonproliferation. That would only increase U.S. domestic and allied 
opposition to the nuclear risk reduction agenda. Instead, I am suggesting that we find ways to 
reassure current members of the U.S. alliance system about their security on the road to zero that 
have a positive, or neutral, rather than a negative effect on the security of those outside the 
alliance system.  At the same time, we should be strengthening existing regional cooperative 
security institutions and creating new ones so that we have efficient, effective, and inclusive 
options available for addressing a progressively wider array of regional security challenges. 
 
A good place to begin would be by replacing regional threat assessments with more 
comprehensive joint evaluations of regional security conditions by military, diplomatic, and 
economic experts. Such evaluations would evaluate how different kinds of security risks have 
increased or decreased since the end of the Cold War, considering not only the changing 
distribution of military capabilities but also the intensifying patterns of economic 
interdependence, information flows, and non-military security challenges such as pandemic 
disease and environmental degradation. They would also survey the full range of options for 
managing risks, minimizing conflict, and maximizing cooperation on regional security problems, 
weighing the net effects of building up national or alliance military capabilities against the net 
effects of other options.  
 
Even if these comprehensive joint security assessments were conducted only among countries 
that are already members of the U.S. alliance system, the effort could have reassuring effects for 
both insiders and outsiders. Exaggerated threat perceptions could be corrected, while well-
grounded concerns could be more widely acknowledged and more effectively addressed with 
fewer unintended consequences on military, economic, and political relationships with others in 
the region. Even more mutual reassurance could be provided by including countries outside the 
U.S. alliance system in such comprehensive joint regional security assessments and by using the 
results to build support for strengthening inclusive cooperative security organizations. 
 
Institutional Capacity for International Governance  
 
The need to build up more inclusive cooperative security institutions to complement, and 
someday perhaps, to replace exclusive military alliances raises a third common cause of 
ambivalence about progressive nuclear risk reduction—the weaknesses of existing international 
organizations. It is fair to ask how anyone can talk seriously about the verified elimination of 
nuclear weapons when the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not negotiated anything for 
over a decade and the Security Council cannot decide on a coherent response to Iranian non-
compliance with its existing nuclear obligations.  
 
More effort has been devoted by states and nongovernmental actors to building the global 
nuclear restraint regime than to developing principles, norms, rules, joint decision-making 
procedures, and compliance mechanisms for any other security issue. Given the enormity of the 
stakes, countries were often reluctant to compromise with each other or to cede much power to 
an implementing organization. But knowledge of the vast devastation caused by a single fission 
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bomb and of the likely consequences of a thermonuclear war spurred negotiators and activists to 
keep working against strong resistance.  
 
The end of the Cold War brought major advances in both the constraints and the compliance 
mechanisms that states were willing to accept on their nuclear programs. Instead of building on 
this progress, though, some states and non-governmental actors who had historically been the 
strongest supporters of legally binding agreements and effective verification decided they were 
no longer worth the trouble. The Bush administration’s attitude represented the most dramatic 
reversal from earlier U.S. leadership in building the nuclear restraint regime. But a number of 
countries and advocacy organizations that still favored denuclearization of security policies also 
shifted their emphasis. Some decided that the likelihood of large-scale nuclear war was now low 
enough that they should concentrate on land mines, small arms, and other weapons that kill many 
innocent civilians on an annual basis. Others continued to view nuclear proliferation and terrorist 
acquisition as urgent security priorities. But they hoped that the end of the Cold War would make 
it possible to gain the requisite cooperation through “innovative” instruments: political 
declarations, codes of conduct, transparency and confidence-building measures, and cooperative 
threat reduction.  
 
Ironically, now that the Obama administration wants to lead a global effort to achieve the 
verified elimination of nuclear weapons, we have fewer governance tools and less ability to 
create new ones than we did during the Cold War. Many of the most critical legacy agreements 
no longer exist or are in jeopardy; vital organizations like the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) are under-staffed and under-resourced; the United States and other key countries 
have lost much of their relevant diplomatic and technical expertise; and the main multilateral 
disarmament negotiating forum has forgotten how to function after a decade of disuse.  
 
The arms control and nonproliferation community is internally divided about the appropriate 
response to this serious problem. Some members want to invest more heavily in trying to 
strengthen state capacity to do governance activities that only states can do—such as negotiate 
and implement legally binding agreements and operate inter-governmental organizations with 
substantial authority, budgets, and staff. Others prefer to shift more attention and resources 
towards informal policy coordination and nongovernmental cooperative initiatives in hopes that 
they can accomplish more for less in a shorter period of time.  
 
The Obama administration is clearly ambivalent about this question, as are many other 
governments of large and small countries. Part of their ambivalence reflects the difficulty of 
deciding whether the benefits of legal agreements that constrain others’ behavior, reduce 
misperceptions, and increase predictability outweigh the costs of future constraints on one’s own 
flexibility and freedom of action. Another part stems from difficulty deciding whether the long-
term value of building the strongest possible mechanisms to eliminate nuclear risks outweighs 
the short-term costs of negotiating, ratifying, and implementing legally binding agreements with 
effective verification, compliance management, and enforcement provisions.  
 
The governance dilemma is even sharper for nongovernmental analysts and advocates. They may 
understand intellectually that of all the global governance challenges, nuclear weapons are—and 
should remain—at the end of the issue spectrum where governments have the most control over 
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outcomes. But nongovernmental actors often have little insight into why governmental efforts to 
reduce nuclear risks move as slowly as they do. They also know that the more state-centric the 
nuclear risk reduction strategy is, the less directly they can contribute. 
 
To make progress on the governance problem, a first step is to start thinking about some 
transaction costs of security cooperation as prudent investments, not something to be avoided or 
minimized whenever possible. While voluntary confidence and transparency building measures 
may be sufficient for low-risk, low-consequence security problems, it will be impossible to 
persuade all states to reduce or eliminate their nuclear weapons without clear-cut legal 
obligations, unprecedented verification arrangements, and highly evolved implementing 
organizations. Even on low-risk, low-consequence security cooperation, it may make sense to 
put the agreement in legal form, to include some joint verification measures, and to demonstrate 
high levels of compliance as a way to build the institutional infrastructure and the trust that will 
become increasingly important as the world moves towards nuclear elimination.  
 
To take an example favored by fans of voluntary cooperation, parallel presidential nuclear 
initiatives (PNIs) were the fastest way to address urgent concerns about control of tactical 
nuclear weapons during the break-up of the Soviet Union. But the non-binding pledges could 
have had much greater value over time if the two leaders had followed their public 
announcements by directing teams of diplomats, lawyers, and technical experts to develop a 
more detailed accord specifying what each side had committed to do, how they would document 
that they had done it, and whether or not they were obligated not to undo it in the future. There 
would be less uncertainty, and fewer unsubstantiated accusations. We would have a bigger pool 
of governmental and nongovernmental experts with more shared knowledge about all kinds of 
non-strategic nuclear weapons. And we would have a stockpile of precedents, including 
definitions, monitoring technologies, and dismantlement procedures, which could be used now 
that some of the same people who insisted that we did not need formal controls on tactical 
nuclear weapons in the 1990s believe that we cannot have further strategic reductions without 
them.  
 
A second recommendation is to use the institution-building resources that we have more 
efficiently and effectively.  After a decade during which arms control was belittled as an 
outmoded relic of the Cold War, the Obama administration and other governments, as well as 
numerous independent entities engaged in nuclear analysis and advocacy, have started trying to 
rebuild and expand their capacity to negotiate, ratify, and implement arms control and 
nonproliferation accords. But no matter how much renewed energy and additional funds we can 
bring to this project, it will be a long time before the combined assets on the side of cooperative 
security come anywhere close to those on the side of competitive security. Therefore, we must be 
much smarter and more creative, doing our best to cooperate rather than compete amongst 
ourselves.  
 
The problem of counterproductive competition among groups advocating for nuclear arms 
control, nonproliferation, and elimination is unfortunate. On paper, each group is committed to 
working synergistically with other initiatives. But in practice, competition for a larger share of 
limited funding and policy attention can lead groups working on the same issue to withhold 
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information that might be more usefully shared, and to build up the perceived value of their 
group by putting down the others.   
 
There is another counterproductive division within the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation 
community. The word “academic” is often used as a pejorative by diplomats and activists who 
want to suggest that their analysis is realistic and results-oriented, in contrast to work by scholars 
in ivory towers. Such a sweeping dismissal of everything academic can have unintended 
consequences. It undermines the professional standing of those in universities who are doing 
policy-oriented research, making it harder for officials and advocacy groups to use academic 
research to inform debates and influence outcomes. That plays into the hands of anti-arms 
control ideologues who do not want contrary facts to complicate their agendas. It impedes the 
flow of ideas and individuals between universities and organizations doing day-to-day policy 
work, with damaging effects now and on the training and career aspirations of potential future 
nuclear experts. It also provides a convenient way to avoid uncomfortable questions about 
whether “practical” plans for eliminating nuclear weapons have a comprehensive and realistic 
enough understanding of the problem to achieve the desired results.  
 
Some steps to strengthen nuclear governance require governments to confront their own 
ambivalence about the associated costs and risks. Getting the CD functioning smoothly again or 
replacing it with one or more negotiating bodies that would be more effective involves both 
strong and weak states deciding that the ability to negotiate new multilateral security agreements 
is more important than maintaining veto power over anything that might be proposed for 
negotiation in the future. All states still need strong assurances that their concerns will be 
considered carefully and that they will not be expected to sign any agreement that does not serve 
their security interests. But those positive functions of the consensus process can still be 
accomplished without allowing any one member to block initiation of work on a topic of great 
interest to the rest of the community, or to prevent the rest of the members from reaching an 
agreement that would serve their security interests well.7 
 
In addition to showing skeptics that the international community is capable of negotiating new 
agreements to reduce nuclear risks, governments who support this objective must also 
demonstrate that they can cooperate to ensure compliance with existing nuclear agreements. This 
is usually termed an “enforcement” problem, with attention focused on the level of punishment 
needed to compel compliance by a law-breaking state and to deter future violations. But given 
the complexities and ambiguities of security cooperation, we need a broader spectrum of options 
to address non-compliance, along with a greater ability to get international agreement about 
which option is best suited for fixing a given problem and for ensuring full compliance in the 
future.8 When the rules are unclear or a state lacks the capacity to fulfill its obligations, the 
international community needs the diplomatic, legal, technical, and financial resources to provide 
clarification or capacity-building assistance.  If non-compliance is a bargaining strategy to 
increase attention to unresolved security concerns, then other states should show that it is easier 
to address those concerns through cooperation than through adversarial bargaining. Economic 
carrots and sticks can be helpful or counterproductive, depending on the circumstances, but 
increased trade or tighter sanctions will not change behavior if the underlying motives involve 
security, rather than economics or prestige.  
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Peaceful Nuclear Programs and the Challenge of Global Warming 
 
The current international standoff over Iran’s nuclear program raises another source of 
ambivalence within the nuclear nonproliferation community—the fact that the NPT is designed 
to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as to stop proliferation and promote 
disarmament. The treaty places no limits on states’ “inalienable right” to develop and use nuclear 
energy for purely peaceful purposes without discrimination. It also specifies that all members 
have an obligation to facilitate, and a right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials, and information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The problem, of 
course, is that some of the same equipment, materials, and information used for peaceful nuclear 
purposes could be used clandestinely, or openly after treaty withdrawal, for weapons 
applications.  
 
The NPT’s solution to this dilemma is to use IAEA safeguards to confirm the accuracy and 
completeness of non-nuclear weapon states’ claims that all their nuclear materials and facilities 
are being used purely for peaceful purposes. The basic safeguards obligations were deliberately 
designed to be low-cost, non-intrusive, cooperative, and nondiscriminatory because most 
countries using nuclear energy when the treaty was negotiated either already had nuclear 
weapons, and thus were exempt from the safeguards, or were democratic states expected to keep 
their nonproliferation commitments even without close international scrutiny. The NPT 
safeguards regime has been strengthened in recent decades, but it still rests on the basic principle 
that any state can have its own advanced nuclear capabilities, including enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities capable of producing weapon-grade fuel, as long as those national 
facilities are subject to IAEA oversight. 
 
The Iranian case makes nonproliferation experts especially uncomfortable due to the unusual 
nature of that regime, its failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA, and its rejection of Security 
Council demands that it stop enriching uranium. But rather than treat Iran as a unique case, we 
should see it as the leading example of a dilemma that will only intensify as more countries that 
do not already have nuclear weapons and are not deemed inherently trustworthy want to use 
nuclear energy.  
 
The nonproliferation community’s current response is to put more money into the IAEA 
safeguards system, to encourage more countries to accept the Additional Protocol and expand 
IAEA oversight of their programs, and to establish fuel banks or suppliers’ consortium that offer 
fuel for power plants at an attractive enough price that it does not make economic sense for most 
countries to build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities. These incremental measures 
can help at the margins, especially if the global use of nuclear energy remains relatively flat, as it 
has for decades. But the countries of greatest concern right now are not likely to give up 
advanced nuclear capabilities for purely economic reasons. Furthermore, the whole system of 
international safeguards on national nuclear programs will be overwhelmed if, as looks likely, 
the global use of nuclear energy needs to expand dramatically in coming decades in order to 
avert catastrophic climate change.9  
 
The way to avoid an unpalatable choice between nuclear disaster and catastrophic climate 
change was foreshadowed by the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report.10 It argued that the only 
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realistic way to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without the risks posed by 
competitive national nuclear weapons programs would be to establish an international agency 
with direct operational control over all dangerous nuclear materials and activities. The Acheson-
Lilienthal logic was compelling then, and remains so today. Political circumstances should be 
more favorable now that the dominant security concern involves keeping nuclear capabilities 
away from outlaw states and terrorist groups, not balancing major powers’ nuclear forces to deter 
attack and minimize coercion. Technological developments are also underway that could be used 
to keep tight control over sensitive materials, facilities, technologies, and expertise without 
internationalizing the entire global nuclear energy generation system. 
 
Nuclear power is currently generated by very large light water reactors (100-1600 MWe) that are 
extremely expensive and time-consuming to build, difficult to site appropriately, and challenging 
to operate safely. Researchers around the world have been working for several decades on 
designs for much smaller reactors (under 300 MWe) with advanced safety features and sealed 
cores containing enough fuel to last for multiple years. They can be used individually for niche 
applications where only a small amount of power is needed or can be handled by the local 
electrical grid, or they can be hooked together to generate as much power as a large reactor. 
 
Current efforts to develop small modular reactors could be redirected to prioritize designs that 
offer the most proliferation-resistance even if they are not the designs that are closest to 
becoming commercially available. Technically sounds designs exist for small reactors with 
sealed cores that would not require refueling for multiple decades. Regional fuel-cycle centers 
could produce these light weight, passively safe reactors; transport them by rail, road, or barge to 
the desired location; then return them to the regional center for spent fuel management. 
Implementing this hub-and-spoke arrangement on a large enough scale to help avert catastrophic 
climate change would require both nuclear disarmament and subordination of national and 
commercial advanced fuel cycle operations to international control. That is hard to envision 
under current conditions, but it is even harder to figure out how we can simultaneously avert 




Negotiating, ratifying, and implementing nuclear risk reduction measures have never been easy. 
It may be even harder to admit, therefore, that some of the strategies adopted to build support for 
arms control and nonproliferation in like-minded countries have had the unintended effect of 
decreasing support for nuclear cooperation outside of the U.S. alliance system. Likewise, some 
of the “innovative” ways to make nuclear cooperation easier have ended up neither providing as 
much direct security benefit as their proponents originally hoped, nor helping to develop the 
institutional infrastructure needed for more ambitious and effective forms of cooperation.   
 
Acknowledging these counter-productive patterns illuminates things about our own attitudes and 
strategic choices that can be changed to get more productive results. For each of the four areas of 
ambivalence, I have tried to give concrete suggestions for steps that are within our own control 
and that could provide both internal and external reassurance, rather than addressing our own 
concerns at a potential cooperative partner’s expense. By thinking about nuclear risk reduction as 
a two-level game where the only realistic way to get the desired result is to find moves that 
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increase the prospects for both domestic and international agreement, it becomes easier to 
identify practical things that governments and organizations can do that would enjoy support not 
only with their own policy elites, publics, and allies, but also with other countries whose 
participation is key to the success of cooperative security arrangements.  
 
Recognizing the complex connections between the nuclear risk reduction agenda and other types 
of global challenges also makes it easier to work productively with people who do not share an 
intense concern with nuclear policy, but do share our broader commitment to building equitable 
and inclusive governance arrangements that enhance mutual security and well-being. Rather than 
complaining when global warming receives more media coverage and policy attention than 
nuclear weapons do, or arguing about where nuclear weapons should rank as a security priority 
compared with ending civil violence and building sustainable peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 
should look for potential synergies among these disparate issues. Seen in this way, the number of 
national, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental actors working on cooperative responses to 
global challenges far outnumbers the people and resources devoted to purely military solutions. 
Having the power of numbers on our side is not enough to counteract the disproportionate role 
that nuclear weapons and competitive military programs have come to play in the world today, 
but it should make it easier to find partners, combine resources, and choose effective strategies 
for the hard, but vitally important, work ahead. 
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